This Workshop is dedicated to the 100th anniversary of the publication of the article “Two-Valued Logic” (1921) by Jan Lukasiewicz, where or the first time in the history of modern formal logic the falsehood of an assertion was related not to a particular circumstance (“state of affair”) but to the act of rejection. Namely he wrote: “The words “I assert” are denoted by U, and the words “I reject” by N. I consider the sentences: 𝑈 : 1, 𝑁 : 0, which are read: “I assert truth” and “I reject falsehood”, respectively, to be the fundamental principles of two-valued logic [. . . ]”

Later on elsewhere, Lukasiewicz wrote that “of two intellectual acts, to assert a proposition and to reject it, only the first has been taken into account in modern formal logic [. . . ]” while “the idea of rejection [. . . ] has been neglected [. . . ]”. However, even in the traditional treatment of classical logic, a reference to refutation appears, albeit implicitly, when the assertion ‘𝐵 implies 𝐴’, where 𝐴 is an axiom, is accepted as true. This is not because the assertion 𝐵 is stronger than the assertion 𝐴, but rather because the refutation of this implication is impossible.

Those interested in Refutation in Logic are invited to submit their proposals on any aspect related to this subject. Topics may include, but are not restricted to:


• Logical systems including refutation
• Refutation and admissible rules
• Refutation and proof
• Refutation and paraconsistency
• Refutation and negation
• Refutation and non-Fregean logics
• Refutation as operator
• Refutation and semantics (matrix, inferentialist, etc.)
• Refutation and abductive reasoning
• Refutation and the philosophy of language
• Refutation and meaning theory

To submit a contribution, please send a one-page abstract by the deadline to the organizers of the workshop.

Accepted submissions will be invited to submit a paper to a book or a special issue that will be edited by the organizers after the workshop.